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ABSTRACT
Smart medical devices will only be smart if they also in-
clude technology to provide security and privacy. In practice
this means the inclusion of cryptographic algorithms of suf-
ficient cryptographic strength. For battery operated devices
or for passively powered devices, these cryptographic algo-
rithms need highly efficient, low power, low energy realiza-
tions. Moreover, unique to cryptographic implementations
is that they also need protection against physical tampering
either active or passive. This means that countermeasures
need to be included during the design process.
Similar to design for low energy, design for physical pro-
tection needs to be addressed at all design abstraction lev-
els. Differently, while skipping one optimization step in a
design for low energy or low power, merely reduces the bat-
tery life time, skipping a countermeasure, means opening
the door for a possible attack. Designing for security re-
quires a thorough threat analysis and a balanced selection
of countermeasures.
This paper will discuss the different abstraction layers
and design methods applied to obtain low power/low en-
ergy and at the same time side-channel and fault attack
resistant cryptographic implementations. To provide a vari-
ety of security features, including location privacy, it is clear
that medical devices need public key cryptography (PKC).
It will be illustrated with the design of a low energy ellip-
tic curve based public key programmable co-processor. It
only needs 5.1µJ of energy in a 0.13 µm CMOS technology
for one point multiplication and includes a selected set of
countermeasures against physical attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely known that medical data needs the highest
protection against disclosure and against tampering [2]. In-
deed medical devices and medical data have a long lifespan.
For instance, the battery of a pacemaker will last for 5 to
15 years before it is replaced. In addition, pacemakers and
other medical (implantable) devices, wireless sensors, RFID
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
DAC ’13, May 29 - June 07 2013, Austin, TX, USA.
Copyright 2013 ACM 978-1-4503-2071-9/13/05 ...$15.00.
tags, and others have become more sophisticated over the
years. Instead of only issuing a fixed electrical pulse, they
are now tuned to the patient. Similar arguments can be
made for body sensors based on BAN, WAN or RFID tech-
nology: they pick up vital signs and transmit them to a
wearable collector of data, e.g. the patient’s cellular phone.
The longevity of medical data explains the need for secu-
rity levels that last for many years , since the attackers only
get stronger over time due to Mooer’s law. Unfortunately,
longer key length translates in a larger computational load.
On top, the devices itself are not protected inside com-
puter rooms or behind walls. Therefore, physical attacks,
active or passive, are possible. For instance, pacemakers
can be remotely updated or tuned. This wireless link can be
eavesdropped, or it can be used to interfere with the read-
ings or settings of the pacemaker. Wireless tags which are
used to monitor the health status, give a patient much more
freedom of movement and allow medical staff to monitor a
patient without being bedridden. However, this can also be
used to track patients and therefore location privacy is an
important concern.
The goal of this paper is to provide insight on how to
combine efficiency (in terms of energy or power consump-
tion) with high security levels. We claim that this can only
be reached by considering all design abstract levels. In this
sense, design for security is similar to design for low power
or low energy. It is also different, as a designer has to de-
cide which is the right abstraction level to address particular
attacks.
To illustrate this, the paper is organized as follows. We
first describe some typical scenario’s and the associated se-
curity analysis in section 2. A security analysis is used to
select the type of cryptographic algorithms and protocols
required for the application. In section 3, we discuss the de-
sign abstraction levels, which we call the security pyramid.
Algorithms and protocols to address the security require-
ments are addressed in section 4. The architecture level is
discussed in section 5 and the circuit level in section 6. Fi-
nally, the security evaluation is discussed in section 7.
2. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In a typical scenario, we assume that a patient wears sev-
eral medical devices and sensors, some of them are worn on
the body such as a hearing aid, or an insulin pump, others
are implanted, such as a pacemaker or a brain monitoring
or stimulation device [2].
In this typical scenario, these sensors and actuators com-
municate over a wireless channel: this could be a BAN
(body-area-network), RFID, Zigbee or similar. One exam-
ple is the Human++ project of IMEC [15]. In this scenario
a device, a cellular phone or similar, will serve as the local
mini server, meaning that it collects the data and controls
the network. It is assumed that this mini server is energy
rich compared to the sensors and actuators. In a typical
use case, the sensors will transmit patient data, e.g. his or
her vital signs to the mini-server. Confidentiality, source au-
thentication as well as integrity of this data are important.
This is needed in both directions, i.e. mutual authentication
is needed.
Recently, privacy received a lot of attention, more specifi-
cally location privacy or resistance to tracking. While early
protocols did not make a distinction in types of privacy [9],
more recent papers aim at providing strong privacy levels
[14].
A careful choice of the protocols is only half of the security
analysis. It is a necessary but not sufficient requirement
to attain the desired security goals such as confidentiality,
authentication and integrity.
For the system to be secure, we also require the imple-
mentation of the protocols be secure against an adversary
that may have physical or short-distance access to the med-
ical device. Techniques belonging to the broad class of side-
channel attacks, such as Power Analysis [7, 8] have been
used to extract keys from embedded devices by only mon-
itoring the execution time of a cryptographic computation
or the power consumption of the device (even in a remote
contact-less fashion with specialized antennas that pick up
the electromagnetic emanations of the chip).
In general, side-channel attacks exploit additional infor-
mation that is available during the cryptographic compu-
tation aside from the input and output values, in contrast
to classical cryptanalytical attacks. It is clear that should
an attacker extract cryptographic keys from an embedded
medical device, the security of the protocol is compromised.
Hence, the implementation of a medical embedded device
should provide some degree of protection against physical
attacks, such as tampering or side-channel attacks. In the
next sections, we address the design procedure, best prac-
tices and decisions that are made in different abstraction
levels when designing an exemplary crypto-processor for ef-
ficiency, low power, low energy and security.
3. DESIGN METHODS FOR LOW POWER
AND SECURITY
Over the years, many design methods for low power and/or
low energy have been developed. These design methods are
situated at different abstraction levels. It is generally ac-
cepted and shown in practice that optimizations at higher
abstraction levels have a bigger impact than those at lower
abstraction levels.
An early paper showing the importance of transformations
for low power is the paper by Chandrakasan et al. [3]. It
shows that techniques like pipelining and parallelism can be
used to reduce the power consumption. Others showed the
importance of transformations or techniques at system level,
e.g. the memory transformations introduced in [13]. At cir-
cuit level, also many techniques have been introduced: well
known examples are gated clock strategies, reduced swing
strategies or the introduction of power domains.
We distinguish the following abstraction levels for our pur-
Figure 1: Security pyramid.
pose [21], as shown in Figure 3. The top level is the appli-
cation or ’system’ level. The selection of the protocol and
the associated cryptographic algorithms has a huge influence
on the final power or energy consumption of the embedded
medical device. Next, is the algorithm level. For secret key
and certainly for public-key algorithms there is a wide selec-
tion of algorithms and implementation strategies. The next
level is the architecture level, where a digital platform for the
implementation of the protocol and algorithm is selected. In
most embedded applications that require extra physical pro-
tection, a HW/SW co-design platform is chosen. Typically
there is an embedded micro-controller with programmable
co-processors that support cryptographic algorithms. This
is typically the platform of choice for applications like RFID
tags, smart cards, portable devices and also medical devices.
The design is eventually mapped to circuit-level implemen-
tation. In order to resist side-channel analysis, circuit-level
countermeasures are crucial.
4. PROTOCOL AND ALGORITHM
Protocols are designed based on a variety of cryptographic
primitives, such as hash functions, symmetric key ciphers,
public key ciphers. It can also include non-algorithmic prim-
itives, such as Random Number Generators (RNG), secure
storage, or Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Tradi-
tionally, protocol designers consider the security of a proto-
col the first design priority, with minimizing the computa-
tional complexity the second. Since implanted medical de-
vices has strict power and energy budget, protocol designers
need to consider many factors besides security. We identify
a few of them below.
• Security properties. The security properties of a pro-
tocol should be clearly specified. In case of a pace-
maker, mutual authentication is required to prevent
impersonation. In order to protect the privacy of the
patient, sensitive data should also be encrypted. Note
that a modification on the ciphertext may also lead to
a corrupted therapy that endanger the patient’s life.
Therefore, data authentication is also required. As
such, the communication protocol between the pace-
maker and the server should at least include mutual
authentication, data authentication and encryption.
• Location privacy is a separate concern. It protects the
user against tracking. Location based services are of-
fered as part of many phone applications. In this case,
accepting or denying it, should be the users choice.
In medical applications, e.g. tracking as a means of
protecting older people, should be strictly limited to
medical personal. Location privacy heavily relies on
public key based protocols.
• The asymmetry between the parties in a protocol, for
instance a tag and a reader should also be considered in
the protocol design. Protocols should be designed such
that the heaviest computation load is for the reader (or
other energy rich device) while the load for a tag or a
sensor is minimized. This reduces the computation
load. Other options are specific for the interaction of
light-weight internet of things devices and are based
on threshold cryptography [18].
• Implementation size. Implanted medical devices have
a strict budget for the cryptographic modules: sili-
con area for hardware implementations or code size
for software implementations. Close interaction with
implementation people is needed: e.g. protocol design-
ers tend to believe that hash functions are very cheap
in hardware, thus should be used in light-weight proto-
cols. For the most recent generation of hash functions,
this is no longer true. The smallest SHA-1 implemen-
tation [12] uses 5527 gates, while an ECC core uses
about 12k gates [10].
• Energy usage reduction. Protocols can be improved in
at least three ways to reduce the energy usage on the
device. Firstly, the computation on the device should
be reduced as much as possible. Secondly, the commu-
nication should be minimized since wireless communi-
cation is power-hungry. Thirdly, the protocol should
be designed to minimize energy consumption due to
useless computations. Consider the mutual authenti-
cation between a pacemaker and a server, server au-
thentication should be performed before other opera-
tions. As such, the protocol session stops immediately
on the device when the server authentication fails.
Protocols based on secret key algorithms, like AES, are
often cheaper in computation cost but not necessarily in
communication cost. Secret key algorithms have also the
problem of key distribution and management. Several exer-
cises to evaluate the computation versus communication cost
of secret-key versus public-key based security protocols have
been made: the conclusions depend on the cryptographic al-
gorithm, the digital platform and the wireless distance over
which the communication occurs [5, 4].
Vaudenay [20] showed that public key algorithms are needed
in order to provide strong privacy. However, not all PKC-
based protocols achieves strong privacy. For example, tags
using the Schnorr identification protocol [17] can be easily
traced. We use the identification protocol by Peeters and
Hermans [14] as an example. The protocol is shown in Fig-
ure 4, and it achieves wide-forward-insider privacy 1.
1Wide-forward-insider privacy is a widely used privacy no-
tion in security analysis of private RFID identification pro-
tocols. It covers most practical use cases of private RFID
identification. For a detailed definition, see [14].
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Figure 2: Peeters-Hermans identification protocol
[14].
Elliptic curve cryptography is a favorable choice due to
its relatively small key size and high security level compared
to RSA. An elliptic curve over a finite field F2m is defined
using the simplified Weierstrass function:
y
2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, (1)
where a, b ∈ F2m are curve parameters. All the points
P (x, y) on the curve together with a point at infinity form
an Abelian group E(F2m). We can also add two points and
obtain another point on the curve. Given an integer k, k <
Order(P ), we can define Q = k · P = P + P + ... + P (k
times). The computation of k · P is called elliptic curve
point multiplication (ECPM). The security of ECC is based
on the so-called Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (ECDLP), namely, given Q and P to find k such that
Q = k · P . ECDLP is believed to be computationally infea-
sible.
As shown in Figure 4 the main operation on the tag is two
point multiplications (namely, r ·P and r ·Y ), and one mod-
ular multiplication (namely, er). All the operations should
be protected against side-channel attacks and fault attacks.
The challenge is how to securely perform these operations
and at the same time meet the area and power budget.
The first step is to select curve parameters, which largely
determines the security level and implementation size. Our
ECC chip uses a Koblitz curve [1] defined over F2163 , which
provides 80-bit security, equivalent to 1024-bit RSA. Be-
sides, multiplication in binary extension fields it is carry-
free. As a result, the multiplier is smaller and faster than
integer multipliers.
The point multiplication algorithm directly determines
the performance, the size of temporary storage, the perfor-
mance and also its resistance against side-channel attacks.
Our ECC chip uses the Montgomery powering ladder (MPL)
for ECPMs. Note that MPL also allows us to use only the
x coordinate to represent a point. One coordinate requires
163 bits of memory. Our ECC chip uses six 163-bit reg-
isters for the whole point multiplication. On the contrary,
the best known algorithm for ECPM over a prime field uses
Algorithm 1 Point Multiplication using MPL
Require: An EC y2+xy = x3+ax2+b, a point P = (x, y),
a t-bit integer k, k = (1, kt−2, ..., k0), ki ∈ {0, 1}
Ensure: R = kP
R← (xr, r) //projective coordinate randomizaton
Q← 2 · P
for i = t− 2 downto 0 do
if k = 1 then
R← R+Q, Q← 2 ·Q
else
Q← Q+R, R← 2 ·R
end if
end for
R← RecoverY (P,R)
Return R
8 registers excluding a and b [6]. The MPL algorithm is
also resistant against Timing and Simple Power Analysis
Attacks. In order to prevent Differential Power Analysis, we
use randomized projective coordinates. More details about
the countermeasures are discussed in the following section.
5. ARCHITECTURE LEVEL
At this level, we still have the same design dimensions
(area, speed, power, energy, security) but estimations be-
come more accurate. Optimizing the design on one dimen-
sion may lead to deterioration on the others. Here we de-
scribe several methods for algorithm level optimization.
• Identify the root of trust. Adding countermeasures
leads to larger area or longer running time. Therefore,
it is important to partition the design into a secure
zone and an insecure zone. The secure zone operates
on the sensitive data, this part should be protected
using state-of-the-art countermeasures. The insecure
zone contains the non-critical parts of the systems such
as parts of the algorithm that don’t depend on the se-
cret information: this part can be implemented using
a standard design flow. As long as the insecure zone
is not compromised, the security of the system as a
whole remains. One elegant solution is using a secure
co-processor for the critical parts of the algorithm and
an ordinary processor for everything else. The secure
co-processor can then be strengthened by applying the
countermeasures at the circuit level, or even using a
full-custom approach.
• Architecture-level security evaluation. A crypto co-
processor usually includes both hardware and software.
The hardware part helps to achieve a high energy ef-
ficiency, while the software part provides flexibility.
Sensitive data should appear only on the internal data-
bus, and should not be available through the instruc-
tion set. So, no strange combination of instructions
should release the key or the private date. For ex-
ample, a procedure that reads the secret key from
the memory and sends it to the output should not be
programmable with the given instructions. Moreover,
countermeasures against side-channel attacks need to
be included. At a minimum, to prevent timing attacks,
all instructions should execute with a constant number
of cycles.
• Area-power-security trade-off. Although global opti-
mization seems to be difficult, local optimization is
possible for the trade-off between area, execution time
and power consumption. For instance, in our ECC
co-processor, a digit-serial multiplier for F2163 is used.
The choice of the digit-size determines the power needed
for the computation, as well as the latency and area
[16]. By using a digit serial multiplication with a 163×
4 modular multiplier we achieve the optimal area-energy
product within the given latency constraints. More-
over, the execution time is independent of the key
length.
6. CIRCUIT LEVEL
If the basic design building blocks, the logic gates, are
not designed to support security, the problem propagates to
higher levels of abstraction and compromises the security of
the complete system. Ignoring the problems at the circuit
level, can make countermeasures at protocol, algorithm or
architecture level irrelevant.
Most digital integrated circuits use standard CMOS logic
due to its compact area, low power and availability of a
standard cell design methodology. However, CMOS circuits
have one fundamental security weakness. During the 0→ 1
transition at the output, a CMOS gate consumes power from
the source which is not the case for 0 → 0, 1 → 1 or 1 → 0
transitions. This asymmetry is what enables the attacker to
develop a power consumption model and, by comparing the
model prediction with the actual measurements, extract the
secret information.
Sense amplifier based logic (SABL) consumes the same
amount of energy regardless of the data being processed
which is achieved by using complementary outputs and dy-
namic operation. In order to have a meaningful improve-
ment, this countermeasure has to be accompanied by a bal-
anced layout of dual signal wires. Alternative style, Wave
Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) operates using the same
principle, and is compatible with regular synthesis, and place
and route tools [19]. Side-channel resistant logic styles are
the most efficient countermeasures to prevent power analy-
sis, however they come with high area and power cost.
Making the power consumption data independent seems
to be the most promising approach so far. Even when no
dedicated logic style is used, there are several tricks that can
be used to reduce the information leakage in combination
with standard cell based design. These tricks do not provide
the same level of protection as using specialized logic styles
do, but they still increase the attack effort in practice.
• Balance critical signals to reduce the risk of SPA. Crit-
ical signals are typically control signals driving the
multiplexers. These control signals usually connect
to many multiplexers (164 in the presented ECC co-
processor) as well as to a complex network of long wires
and signal repeaters. Due to this high capacitive load,
signal transitions will cause a noticeable pattern in the
power trace. E.g. Figure 6 illustrates how multiplexer
control signals can depend on the value of the key bit
k. These signals have to be encoded in such way that
the corresponding hamming differences are constant,
otherwise the unbalance will reflect in the power trace.
Regular layout structure and identical routing of these
signals will make this countermeasure more effective.
Figure 3: Register updating scheme and multiplexer
encoding.
• Avoid data-dependent clock-gating. Clock gating may
be a tempting solution to reduce dynamic power, how-
ever, in some cases, overly aggressive clock gating can
introduce security risks. If different registers are en-
abled depending on the secret key different parts of the
clock tree will be activated. The corresponding dif-
ference in power consumption will result in a clearly
visible pattern in the power trace, thereby enabling
an SPA. The mere fact that a different set of regis-
ters is gated, can be linked to a particular instruction
sequence and directly or indirectly to the key.
• Isolate the inputs to the data-paths. When register out-
puts are connected to the data-path, updating the reg-
ister value will cause spurious signal transitions inside
the data-path. This will increase the power consump-
tion but it will also compromise the security since the
power consumption is correlated with the data loaded
to the register. The solution is to set data-path inputs
to a fixed value when it is not used. This can usually
be implemented using AND gates and enable signals.
• Avoid glitches. This is a good practice for low power
design since unwanted glitches result in higher power
consumption. Even when the number of 0 → 1 tran-
sitions is balanced at the higher abstraction levels,
glitches that appear in the data-path can cause data-
dependent power consumption thereby enabling an at-
tack. Please note that dynamic differential logic (such
as SABL andWDDL) provide inherent protection against
glitching. Other circuit styles were broken based on
glitches [11].
The presented circuit-level optimization techniques reduce
the risk of side-channel attacks and increase the security of
the system. Some of these design practices align well with
the power reduction techniques, while others are in clear
contradiction.
A prototype chip for the ECC co-processor, based on
the architecture presented in [10] is fabricated using UMC
0.13µm process. At the operating frequency of 847.5kHz
and core voltage V dd = 1V , the processor consumes 50.4µW
and uses only 5.1µJ for one point-multiplication. At this
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Figure 4: Typical workflow for side-channel attacks
frequency, the throughput is 9.8 point multiplications per
second.
7. SECURITY EVALUATION
A security evaluation typically starts with a white-box
evaluation of a prototype chip and system. In a white-box
evaluation, the attacker has complete access to the inner
working details of the chip, including a precise description of
the countermeasures implemented, and is generally regarded
as a worst-case evaluation. A real attacker, later-on in a
practical setting, will have less information available. The
countermeasures used in the prototype co-processor were
evaluated in a worst-case lab setting as Figure 4 depicts.
The setup allows high sampling resolution of the instanta-
neous power consumption of the device.
Timing attacks exploit the timing variance with different
inputs to provide some information about the key [7]. The
prototype co-processor is intrinsically resistant to timing at-
tacks. This is due to the fact that the computation time of
a point multiplication is the same for different key values.
This is achieved by careful optimizations on two abstrac-
tion levels. At the algorithm level, the Montgomery pow-
ering ladder requires the same number of iterations, while
at architecture level, it is ensured that each iteration uses a
constant number of clock cycles.
Moreover, since the same operations are executed in the
same order in every invocation of the scalar multiplication
routine (regardless of the value of the key), the device is
mostly secure against attacks that inspect the power con-
sumption signature of the device, a.k.a Simple Power Anal-
ysis (SPA) attacks. We identified a complex attack that
could extract the key since a small source of SPA leakage
was detected in our white-box evaluation. However, in or-
der for the attacker to exploit it, he has to perform a com-
plex profiling phase with an identical device that is under
his total control, which is outside of the scope of our initial
requirements. One of the causes of this SPA leakage might
be that, although at the layout level the design was carefully
balanced, slight unbalances are still present in the layout.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [8] is a statistical tech-
nique used to recover the key of a cryptographic chip from its
instantaneous power consumption, provided that the power
consumption is related to the intermediate data processed.
Informally, DPA recovers the key in a divide-and-conquer
fashion by comparing the measured power consumption with
several hypothesized power consumptions, one for each sub-
key hypothesis. It is generally expected that the similarity
between the measured power consumption and the predicted
power consumption will be high only for the correct key hy-
pothesis. Note that the power consumption can be picked
up remotely from the electromagnetic emission of the chip
by using specific-purpose antennas.
To prevent DPA, the chip randomizes the internal points
representation by using a random Z coordinate in each ex-
ecution. Since the intermediate values cannot be predicted,
DPA attacks cannot be mounted.
We empirically confirmed that DPA attacks are correctly
thwarted by using randomized projective coordinates. When
the countermeasure is disabled, a DPA attack succeeds with
as low as 200 traces. When the countermeasure is enabled,
but the randomness is known, the attack also succeeds. This
scenario is only possible in a white-box evaluation and does
not correspond to the normal operation of the chip. In the
normal operation, the randomness is generated by the chip
and kept secret to the adversary. The fact that the attack
works in this lab setting provides confidence on the sound-
ness of the attack. When the countermeasure is enabled,
and the randomness is unknown, the attack does not suc-
ceed. Even 20000 traces are not enough to reveal a single
key bit, using the same DPA attack.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Making a device secure adds an extra design dimension.
Indeed, for the design of medical devices, a trade-off be-
tween security, power and energy needs to be made. We
have described the security traps on each abstraction level
and presented the corresponding design guidelines. This is
illustrated with the design of a light-weight co-processor for
elliptic curve cryptography.
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